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FORECLOSURE, LOSS, AND THE PROPER
DISTRIBUTION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
UNDER OPEN AND STANDARD MORTGAGE
CLAUSES: SOME OBSERVATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The mortgage clause is a provision in the mortgagor's property
insurance policy that is designed to protect the mortgagee against
loss from causes covered by the policy. Basically there are two cate-
gories of mortgage clauses, and the phrases "open mortgage clause"
and "standard mortgage clause" will be employed herein to desig-
nate these categories.'
When cases involve foreclosure followed by loss or loss followed
by foreclosure, the interpretation of a particular mortgage clause
and the proper distribution of proceeds can prove to be difficult and
confusing. These problems are accentuated when the mortgagee
purchases the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at
foreclosure sale. The primary objectives in dealing with these issues
are: (1) to present a brief background of open and standard mort-
gage clause principles, (2) to analyze representative cases and con-
sider the soundness of the decisions, and (3) to illustrate the inequi-
ties which arise from mechanically applying a rule of law concerning
distribution of proceeds in standard mortgage clause loss-
foreclosure situations.
BACKGROUND: BASIC PRINCIPLES
Open Mortgage Clause
The open mortgage clause provides that "loss, if any, is payable
to the mortgagee as his interest may appear, subject nevertheless to
all the conditions of this policy." Under this type of clause the
mortgagee is an appointee to receive the insurance funds recovera-
ble in case of loss, recovery being limited by the extent of the mort-
gagor's interest. 2 The interest insured is the mortgagor's interest in
the property; the mere fact that the policy is payable to the mortga-
1. The open mortgage clause is sometimes referred to as a simple loss-payable clause,
and the standard mortgage clause is sometimes called a union mortgage clause.
2. Capital Fire ins. Co. v. Langhorne, F4, d 2 41, (8t. .. ..... Pos V..
Firemen's Ins. Co., 49 111. App. 2d 209, 216, 199 N.E.2d 44, 48 (1964); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Woods
Lumber Co., 182 Okla. 65, 67, 76 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1938).
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gee does not constitute insurance of the mortgagee's interest.' The
phrase "as his interest may appear," therefore, refers to the amount
of the debt owed to the mortgagee4 and signifies that the insurer will
pay the mortgagee only to the extent that his mortgage is a lien or
charge on the premises.'
Since it is the mortgagor's interest in the property that is in-
sured, the mortgagee's right of recovery is no greater than that of
the mortgagor.' Thus, a breach of the policy conditions by the mort-
gagor which prevents recovery by him also prevents recovery by the
mortgagee.' Accordingly, if the mortgage debt is extinguished in any
way, the mortgagee is not entitled to any insurance proceeds.' The
mortgagee's interest under the policy extends only to a security for
his debt, and such interest ceases when the debt is extinguished.' A
foreclosure of the mortgaged property and the mortgagee's purchase
of the property for the full extent of the debt, therefore, totally
extinguish the interest. As a result, the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee, or debtor and creditor, is dissolved."
The addition of an open mortgage clause to the policy does not
alter the terms of the insurance contract between insurer and mort-
gagor." No greater or different burden is assumed by the insurer due
to the presence of the clause, because the clause merely designates
3. Wharen v. Markle Banking & Trust Co., 145 Pa. Super. 99, 101, 20 A.2d 885, 887
(1941); 5A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3401, at 284 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; 11 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 42:661 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as COUCH].
4. In Eagle Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 22 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Cal. 1938) it
was stated:
The words "as their interest may appear," in insurance policies, have been
before the courts repeatedly. They refer to debts owed by the insured. When a mort-
gagee is so designated, the clause , . . means that the insurer will pay the mortgagee
"to the extent of his lien. at the time of the loss.
Id. at 547.
5. Sias v. Roger Williams Inc. Co., 8 F. 187, 188 (C.C.D. N.H. 1880); APPLEMAN § 3401,
at 285; COUCH § 42:662.
6. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Woods Lumber Co., 182 Okla. 65, 67, 76 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1938);
43 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 766, at 748 (1969); COUCH § 42:671.
7. Haskin v. Green, 205 Or. 140, 145, 286 P.2d 128, 132 (1955); 43 AM. JuR. 2d
Insurance § 766, at 748 COUCH § 42:671.
8. COUCH § 42:661.
9. Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 16, 60 P. 467 (1900);
COUCH § 42:661.
10. Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 16, 60 P. 467 (1900);
COUCH § 42:661.
11. Wharen v. Markle Banking & Trust Co., 145 Pa. Super. 99, 101, 20 A.2d 885, 887
(1941); COUCH § 42:663.
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to whom the loss will be paid.'" It follows that no original contract
of indemnity between insurer and mortgagee is created by the open
mortgage clause."
Standard Mortgage Clause
The standard mortgage clause differs appreciably from the
open mortgage clause in that its terms are extremely comprehen-
sive. Those terms which are most pertinent to the discussions below
are as follow:
Loss or damage, if any, under this policy, shall be pay-
able to the mortgagee as his interest may appear, and this
insurance as to the mortgagee only therein, shall not be
invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner
of the within described property, nor by any change in the
title or ownership of the property, nor by the occupation of
the premises for purposes more hazardous than are permit-
ted by this policy, provided, that in case the mortgagor or
owner shall neglect to pay any premium under this policy,
the mortgagee shall on demand pay the same.'4
At the present time most policies protecting the mortgagee con-
tain a standard mortgage clause.'" Courts generally hold that this
clause, unlike the open mortgage clause, operates as an independent
contract between the insurer and the mortgagee,"6 the terms of
which contract are identical to those in the policy itself.'" Because
12. Capital Fire Ins. co. v. Langhorne, 146 F.2d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1945);
CoucH § 42:669.
13. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Woods Lumber Co., 182 Okla. 65, 66, 76 P.2d 273, 274 (1938); 43
AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 766; APPLEMAN § 3401, at 283; CoucH § 42:668.
14. Further provisions of the standard mortgage clause are reproduced in the Appendix,
infra.
15. 43 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 768; see also Cooper, The Effect of the Standard Mort-
gage Clause in Insurance Policies, 12 IND. L.J. 50 (1936-37).
16. A few courts have taken the position that under the standard mortgage clause the
essential elements of a contract are lacking. These courts characterize the status of the
mortgagee as that of a third party creditor-beneficiary. This viewpoint was expressed in
Walker v. Queen Ins. Co., 136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 263 (1926):
The contract of insurance was . . . for the mutual benefit of both mortgagor and
mortgagee, and in no sense a contract between the mortgagee and the insurance
company; the mortgagee being simply a third party who, by the contract between
the mortgagor and the insurance company, acquired a beneficial interest in the
policy, really as additional security to the bond or note secured by the mortgage.
Id. at 151, 134 S.E. at 269.
17. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Mtg. Co., 250 Ala. 609, 610, 35 So.2d 352, 353
(1948); 43 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance § 768.
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an independent contract exists between the insurer and the mortga-
gee, the status of the mortgagee is superior to that of a mere ap-
pointee as under the open mortgage clause.
APPLICATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO OPEN
MORTGAGE CLAUSE CASES
Foreclosure and Subsequent Loss
A case cited frequently is Reynolds v. London & Lancashire
Fire Insurance Co. ," in which the open mortgage clause provided as
follows: "Loss, if any, payable to M.D. Reynolds, on buildings
only.""9 Reynolds foreclosed and purchased the property for the full
amount of the debt, including interest and costs. After the foreclo-
sure but before the period of redemption 0 had expired, the dwelling
house on the property was destroyed by fire. The mortgagor fur-
nished proof of loss and performed all the necessary conditions of
the policy, and the defendant insurance company paid him for all
loss and damage.
In a suit against the insurer for the proceeds, the lower court
held for the mortgagee. The Supreme Court of California reversed,
stating:
[I]n such a case, as the mortgagee has an interest in the
policy only as security for his debt, it follows that such
interest ceases whenever the debt is discharged, and there
is no longer the relation of creditor and debtor between him
and the mortgagor.2 1
The court reasoned that if the mortgagor had extinguished the debt
by paying it, there could be no claim that the mortgagee retained
any cause of action on the policy. Therefore, the foreclosure proceed-
ings and the mortgagee's purchase of the property for the full
18. 128 Cal. 16, 60 P. 467 (1900).
19. Id.
20. The term redemption as utilized herein refers to the statutory right of redemption,
rather than to the equity of redemption. The former may be briefly defined as the mortgagor's
right to buy back property after a foreclosure, while the latter exists only before foreclosure
has occurred. The distinctions were discussed in Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 26
N.E. 899 (1892):
The statutory right does not come into existence until after the sale; nor . . . can it
be barred by a decree foreclosing a mortgage; but the equity of redemption exists
prior to a [foreclosure] suit, and may be barred by a decree.
Id. at 221-22, 26 N.E. at 900.
21. 128 Cal. at 16, 60 P. at 467.
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amount of the debt extinguished fully the debt, and the mortgagee
no longer remained a creditor of the mortgagor. Consequently, there
was no longer an enforceable debt. The mortgagee became the sub-
stantial owner of the property, and the mortgagor retained only the
statutory right of redemption.2
Loss and Subsequent Foreclosure
In Power Building & Loan Association v. Ajax Fire Insurance
Co.,23 the mortgage clause provided that any fire damage to the
insured building would be payable to Power, the mortgagee. '4 After
a fire occurred, the mortgagee foreclosed and purchased the prop-
erty. The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, reversing a
lower court judgment for the mortgagee against the insurer, noted
that the facts did not indicate whether the mortgagee's purchase
equalled the full amount of the mortgage debt. It was held that
there could be no recovery by the mortgagee until such determina-
tion was made. If the purchase price were equivalent to the full
amount of the debt, the debt would be satisfied, and the insurer's
liability to the mortgagee would be cancelled. But if the sale price
did not equal the full amount of the debt, the insurance company
would be liable to the mortgagee-owner for the difference between
the debt and the purchase price at the sale. 5
After observing the foreclosure-loss and loss-foreclosure factual
situations under the open mortgage clause, it is evident that both
Reynolds and Power demonstrate the identical principle: once the
mortgage debt is fully extinguished, either by the mortgagor's pay-
ment or by the mortgagee's foreclosure and purchase for the full
amount of the debt, the mortgagee's rights under the insurance
contract are terminated. These cases are, therefore, in agreement
with the authorities regarding the interests, rights and obligations
22. The Reynolds court held that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale obtains a defeasible
fee and that the debtor retains only a reversionary interest: "[Aifter the sale [the mortga-
gor] has only a right of redemption, while the purchaser has the entire beneficial interest in
the property, subject to be defeated by a redemption from the sale." Id. at 17, 60 P. at 468.
Other courts have held that the purchaser obtains only a lien on the property. See
Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 26 N.E. 899 (1892): "[T]he sheriffs sale did not...
vest title . . . .but it did evidence a lien." Id. at 225, 26 N.E. at 901.
23. 110 N.J.L. 256, 164 A. 410 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
24. Id. at 257, 164 A. at 410.
25. The Power court ruled: "IT]he burden rested on [the mortgagee] to show that
the foreclosure sale did not produce enough to satisfy the mortgage in full, and that the
mortgage debt still remained unsatisfied at least in part." Id. at 258, 164 A. at 411.
1973]
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of the parties in an open mortgage clause situation. As previously
stated, the open mortgage clause insures only the mortgagor's inter-
est, and the mortgagee is merely an appointee to collect the pro-
ceeds. Therefore, when the mortgagor's interest is extinguished, the
mortgagee retains no basis for recovery. Similarly, if the mortgage
debt is dissolved, the mortgagee's interest in the policy is termi-
nated.
The soundness of the principles demonstrated in Reynolds and
Power is well settled with reference to open mortgage clauses. Con-
cerning distribution of insurance proceeds, it is to be noted that no
apparent distinction exists between foreclosure-loss and loss-
foreclosure situations. Observation of the standard mortgage clause
cases, however, will reveal that attempts to distinguish between
foreclosure-loss and loss-foreclosure situations result in: (1) a con-
fusing and inconsistent application of standard mortgage clause
principles, (2) a disregard for the distinctions between open and
standard mortgage clause terms, and (3) the possibility of an ine-
quitable distribution of proceeds.
APPLICATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO STANDARD
MORTGAGE CLAUSE CASES
Foreclosure and Subsequent Loss
The case of Guardian Savings & Loan Association v. Reserve
Insurance Co.26 involved a standard mortgage clause which provided
that the interest of the mortgagee would not be invalidated "by any
foreclosure or other proceedings . . . nor by any change in the title
or ownership of the property .... "27 Because the mortgagor de-
faulted, the mortgagee foreclosed and then purchased at his foreclo-
sure sale; 28 loss occurred after foreclosure. The defendant insurance
company refused payment to the mortgagee, claiming that the pol-
icy only protected the mortgagee's interest as mortgagee, not as
owner. The insurer maintained that at the time of loss the mortga-
gee's interest had ripened into ownership and that therefore the
mortgagee was not entitled to the proceeds. Apparently the insurer
relied on the mortgage clause wording "as interest may appear" 29 to
26. 2 Il. App.3d 77, 276 N.E.2d 109 (1971).
27. Id. at 78, 276 N.E.2d at 110.
28. Although the facts did not so indicate, the assumption is that the purchase price
equalled the full amount of the debt, since the property was undamaged when foreclosure
occurred.
29. This standard mortgage clause wording is very similar to that in open mortgage
[Vol. 7
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signify that protection is only provided for the interest that was held
at the time the policy was issued-that of mortgagee. The insurer
argued further that since the mortgagee had not notified the insurer
of the change in status from mortgagee to owner, a notice require-
ment"0 of the mortgage clause was violated, thus barring the
mortgagee-owner from recovery.
The lower court held that the insurer properly denied the claim
of the mortgagee-owner, but the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed,
ruling that by the terms of the standard mortgage clause the mort-
gagee's rights were not to be invalidated by a foreclosure. To support
this ruling the court quoted an earlier Illinois case:
It is admitted that by the agreement the insurance was
not to be invalidated by a foreclosure, which could only
apply in case the [mortgagor] became the purchaser, for
the reason that if anyone else had purchased the
[mortgagee] would not have had any further insurable in-
terest .3'
The terms of the standard mortgage clause, therefore, were "in-
tended to cover the mortgagee's interest as it succeeded to owner-
ship through foreclosure."3 In addition, the appellate court stated
that "the entire tenor of the mortgage clause is to extend coverage
under various contingencies to the mortgagee, ' 33 and that the terms
of the mortgage clause protect the mortgagee "irrespective of what-
ever interest in the . . .property the mortgagee might succeed to
after foreclosure." 34 The insurer's lack of notice argument was also
rejected, because the court concluded that the notice requirement
was of no real benefit to the insurer in this case.3 .
clauses. Such similarity may account for some of the confusion in distinguishing between the
two clauses.
30. See Appendix infra, where the notice requirement is reproduced.
31. Guardian Say. & L. Ass'n v. Reserve Ins. Co., 2 Ill. App.3d 77, 79, 276 N.E.2d 109,
111 (1971), quoting Trustees of Schools v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 296 Ill. 99, 103,
129 N.E. 567, 569 (1920).
32. Id. at 79, 276 N.E.2d at 111.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. There has been negative reaction to the Guardian decision. See Ferrini, Mortgagee,
Whose Interest Has Ripened Into Ownership Upon Foreclosure, Allowed to Recover Under
Standard Mortgage Clause, INSURANCE ADJUsTER, May 1972, at 10, in which it was contended
that the Guardian decision was "contrary to the interest of the insurance industry as ex-
pressed in the standard ... mortgage clause .... Id. It was emphasized that because the
redemption period had expired, the mortgagee's interest had ripened into ownership. Since
1973]
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In Shores v. Rabon31 the typical provisions of the standard
mortgage clause were present. After the mortgagee purchased for
the full amount of the mortgage debt, the loss occurred. In the
mortgagee's suit to recover the proceeds, the defendant insurer's
main contention was that the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
"was extinguished by the foreclosure sale and that the change of
ownershp and failure to give notice thereof terminated the insurance
contract as to the [mortgagee]. ' ' 31 These arguments were rejected
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. It was restated that the
standard mortgage clause creates a separate and independent con-
tract between the insurer and the mortgagee, and that "it must be
assumed that insurance companies contract and fix rates in full
contemplation of the risk imposed thereby. 3 8 According to the
court, the possibility of foreclosure "entered into the calculations of
the insurer in issuing the contract. ' 3 The mortgagee's insurance,
therefore, was not extinguished by his foreclosure and purchase for
the full debt at the sale. Acquisition of title to the insured property
was characterized as an increase of interest rather than as a change
of ownership,40 and as such was not to defeat the right of a mortga-
gee under a standard mortgage clause, "despite the argument that
the mortgagee's interest as mortgagee had terminated, he should not have been allowed to
recover insurance proceeds, since only his interest as mortgagee was insured. It was further
stated that if the redemption period had not expired, the mortgagee's interest as mortgagee
would have still existed and he should recover. The argument that the word "mortgagee" is
a matter of convenient description was rejected.
It is submitted that the expiration of the redemption period was an important factor for
justifying the recovery in Guardian, because it was then unnecessary to determine the parties'
rights during the redemption period. The Guardian standard mortgage clause contained the
usual foreclosure and change of title terms which were properly recognized by the court.
Furthermore, open mortgage clause language was relied upon to advocate a denial of recovery
to the mortgagee, employing the argument that full extinguishment of the debt by foreclosure
and purchase precludes recovery by the mortgagee.
Under the theory relied upon by Mr. Ferrini, the insurer would be liable to no one in
this situation. Assuming that the mortgagor had no basis for recovery because his interest
had completely disappeared after expiration of the redemption period, the insurer's escape
from liability in this case appears unfair in light of the fact that the event insured against
did occur.
The question concerning how long the original insurance remains in force as protection
for the mortgagee-owner should not be decided by reference to open mortgage clause argu-
ments.
36. 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
37. Id. at 794, 112 S.E.2d at 559.
38. Id. at 795, 112 S.E.2d at 560.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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the word 'mortgagee' in that clause discloses an intention to benefit
one in that capacity only . ... 1
The argument that the word "mortgagee" in a standard mort-
gage clause refers only to one who remains in that capacity was also
rejected in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Codington County
Farmers Fire & Lightning Mutual Insurance Co.,4" where the Su-
preme Court of South Dakota maintained:
[T]he word "mortgagee" is a mere matter of convenient
description or designation, and was not intended to limit
the primary agreement to pay the loss to the beneficiary "as
his interest may appear." It is held that provisions dealing
with change of ownership apply only to strangers of the
insurance contract . . .43
The Union court also emphasized the background and construction
of the standard mortgage clause:
The phraseology of the standard mortgage clause is not the
product of casual or haphazard draftsmanship. . . . It has
emerged from years of practical experience in writing con-
tracts acceptable to the insurers and to mortgagors and
mortgagees. Undoubtedly it was framed with knowledge of
the incidents of the mortgage relation and in contemplation
of the fact that a considerable percentage of the mortgagees
insured thereunder would be forced to take title through
foreclosure of the mortgages. It must be true that the clause
was worded with full understanding that its terms, if am-
biguous, would be construed most strongly against the in-
surer. . . . [I1f it had been intended that the protection
of the mortgagee should cease with the foreclosure of the
mortgage . . . , that intention would have been expressed
in unequivocal words. 4
41. Id.
42. 66 S.D. 561, 287 N.W. 46 (1939).
43. Id. at 565, 287 N.W. at 50. The Union court employed the third party creditor-
beneficiary theory rather than the independent contract theory. See note 16, supra. Neverthe-
less, the court reached a result equivalent to that under the independent contract theory by
maintaining that the third party theory provides the mortgagee with "independent separate
rights enforceable in his own name unaffected by defenses predicated upon acts of the mortga-
gor." Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Codington County Farmers Fire & Lightning Mutual Ins.
Co., supra at 563, 287 N.W. au 43.
44. Id. at 565, 287 N.W. at 50.
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The cases immediately preceding have considered the standard
mortgage clause in situations where loss occurred subsequent to
foreclosure and purchase by the mortgagee. Several principles ex-
emplified in these cases should be reiterated at this time. First, the
weight of authority holds that the standard mortgage clause creates
an independent contract between the insurer and the mortgagee.
Second, the terms of the clause were constructed purposefully and
thus should be effectuated properly. Third, the standard mortgage
clause protects the mortgagee's interest in the property, whereas the
open mortgage clause refers solely to a property interest of the mort-
gagor. Fourth, a change in status from mortgagee to owner through
foreclosure and purchase does not defeat the mortgagee-owner's
right to the insurance proceeds because the provisions of the stan-
dard mortgage clause are designed to accommodate such change in
status.
Although it appears that these four principles should apply
equally to factual situations in which loss occurred prior to foreclo-
sure, the courts have not so applied them. The mortgagee who pur-
chases for the full debt at his foreclosure sale subsequent to the loss
has been denied recovery of insurance proceeds, while his counter-
part who acts prior to the loss has been allowed to recover. A group
of cases dealing with the standard mortgage clause loss-foreclosure
situation deserves special scrutiny in order to isolate those distin-
guishing factors which are said to compel such contrary results. It
is interesting to note that in the loss-foreclosure cases the courts
have either disregarded the standard mortgage clause terms or ne-
gated them through the use of open mortgage clause reasoning.
Loss and Subsequent Foreclosure
In Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Mildenberger" a loss by fire
occurred, after which the mortgagee foreclosed and purchased for
the full amount of the debt. Following the foreclosure sale both
mortgagor and mortgagee claimed the insurance. Although the
applicable standard mortgage clause contained the usual provisions
regarding foreclosure and change of title, the St. Louis Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court judgment for the mortgagee. The
appellate court discussed the independent contract theory but char-
acterized the independent contract therein as a limited one. Quot-
ing from an earlier Missouri case, the court stated:
45. 359 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App. 1962).
[Vol. 7
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[T]he 'union' clause operates as an independent contract
of insurance, which cannot be defeated by a breach on the
part of the mortgagor of the conditions of the policy ....
Observe that, while it is an independent contract, it is such
only for a limited purpose, so that the act of the mortgagor
alone and of itself cannot defeat the right of the mortgagee.
Nevertheless, it is not an entirely disconnected contract.4"
Since the property was in a damaged condition, the court rea-
soned that the mortgagee should have purchased for less than the
full debt. By maintaining that "[in no event was the [mortgagee]
to collect more than the balance due on the note . . . "'I the court
implied that if the mortgagee received insurance proceeds and also
recovered in full the amount of the mortgage debt through his pur-
chase, he would receive more than was actually due to him. The
court further stated that the phrase "as its [the mortgagee's] inter-
est may appear" refers to the amount of the debt owed to the mort-
gagee and not to the mortgagee's interest in the property. Accord-
ingly, the former "can be the only interest of the mortgagee.""
Finally, the court ruled that the mortgagee's interest in the policy,
as well as the creditor-debtor relationship between mortgagee and
mortgagor, were terminated by "the payment of the debt by pur-
chase at foreclosure sale for the full amount of the balance due
''49
In Mildenberger it is clear that the terms of the standard mort-
gage clause were rendered ineffective. First, the court treated the
independent contract established by the clause as a limited one.
Second, the clause was interpreted as referring to the mortgagee's
interest in the insured property. Furthermore, the aspect of the
"double recovery" was introduced. This last factor is more fully
developed in the cases which follow.
Rosenbaum v. Funcannon0 involved a mortgagee who
foreclosed and purchased for the full amount of the debt, although
prior to foreclosure the house on the property was almost completely
destroyed by fire. In affirming the district court's denial of the mort-
46. Id. at 384, quoting Swihart v. Missouri Farmers Mut. Tornado, Cyclone & Winds-
torm Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 998, 1004, 138 S.W.2d 9, 13 (1940).
47. Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Mildenberger, 359 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App. 1962).
48. Id. at 386.
49. Id.
50. 308 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1962).
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gagee's claim for recovery, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit ruled:
[I]t is well settled that full or partial extinguishment of
the debt itself, whether prior to the loss . . . or subsequent
to the loss. . . precludes to the extent thereof, any recovery
by the loss-payable mortgagee for the plain and sole reason
that the debt, itself, has been to that extent extinguished.5
The precedents cited for the quotation above were Reynolds and
Power, two cases that have already been discussed with regard to
open mortgage clauses. In effect, the court's ruling ignored the dis-
tinguishing characteristics between open and standard mortgage
clauses and employed the open mortgage clause theory that extin-
guishment of the debt terminates the mortgagee's rights to the pol-
icy. The court also expressed the theory that the value of the prop-
erty to the bidder is reflected by his bid and that the mortgagee at
the foreclosure sale could have bid less than the full amount of the
debt since the property was severely damaged:
Presumably, [the mortgagee] bid what she thought the
security property to be worth in its condition at the time of
her bid. To bid more than the property was then actually
worth was not required of [the mortgagee], nor would such
a bid be sensible. 52
The obvious inference is that if the mortgagee has received the value
of the debt through his purchase at foreclosure sale, the receipt of
any additional proceeds would constitute a double recovery by the
mortgagee. Thus, the court maintained that the mortgagee should
have bid only up to the value of the damaged property, and that the
remainder could be recovered in a deficiency judgment. 53
Another case dealing with the standard mortgage clause loss-
foreclosure situation is Whitestone Savings & Loan Association v.
Allstate Insurance Co. , 5 in which the Court of Appeals of New York
refused to allow the mortgagee to recover. The court quoted rather
extensively from Rosenbaum to the effect that full extinguishment
51. Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 685.
53. The court stated that "extinguishment of the mortgage ... by the foreclosure
would not have affected [the mortgagee's] right to be paid the remainder of the debt under
the policy." Id.
54. 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971).
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of the debt terminates the mortgagee's interest. 5 Furthermore, it
was maintained by the court that the mortgagee's policy rights after
loss are based on satisfaction of the debt:
[Tihe authorities are unanimous to the effect that if sub-
sequent to the fire the mortgagee has had its debt satisfied
by purchase at foreclosure either by the mortgagee or a
stranger, even by bidding in of the outstanding debt, the
mortgagee's rights under the policy are terminated."
The double recovery arguments introduced in Mildenberger
and Rosenbaum were more fully developed in Whitestone. After
stating that "the mortgagee is entitled to recover only his debt,"57
the Whitestone court continued:
Because a mortgagee is entitled to one satisfaction of his
debt and no more, the bidding in of the debt to purchase
the mortgaged property, thus cutting off other lower bid-
ders, has always constituted a satisfaction of the debt.58
It was emphasized that the mortgagee had "the obvious opportunity
to bid only so much of the debt as equals the value of the property
... , Therefore, the mortgagee "could have bid less, leaving a
deficiency for which the mortgagor would be obligated. . . ."" Bid-
ding the full amount of the debt when such amount -exceeded the
value of the property was viewed by the court as an act that "en-
courages fraud, creates uncertainty as to the mortgagor's rights, and
most unfairly deprives the sale of whatever . . . comes from other
bidders."'" Thus, a kind of estoppel argument was employed to as-
sure that the mortgagee recovers only the amount of the debt.
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS
The open mortgage clause and the standard mortgage clause
have each been considered in this note in two contexts: (1) that in
which loss occurs subsequent to foreclosure, and (2) that in which
loss precedes foreclosure. A single theory employed in open mort-
gage clause cases of both contexts appears sound: the interest in-
55. Id. at 336-37, 270 N.E.2d at 696-97, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
56. Id. at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 337, 270 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
58. Id. at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
59. Id. at 337, 270 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
60. Id. at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
61. Id. at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
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sured is that of the mortgagor, and the mortgagee's interest in the
policy is based only on a security for his debt. Thus, once that debt
is extinguished by the mortgagee's foreclosure and purchase for the
full amount, the mortgagee's interest in the policy is terminated.
The mortgage clause most often employed today, however, is
the standard mortgage clause, and the application of the principles
in standard mortgage clause cases is somewhat confusing. When loss
occurs subsequent to foreclosure and purchase by the mortgagee,
the courts have allowed the mortgagee to recover. In these cases the
mortgagee's interest has been characterized as an interest in the
property. In addition, the terms regarding foreclosure and change of
title have been construed to provide protection to the mortgagee
once he becomes owner through his purchase after foreclosure.
Probably the most difficult cases to rationalize are those involv-
ing loss-foreclosure under the standard mortgage clause. As pre-
viously stated, there appears to be no reason why the outcome of
these cases should differ from the foreclosure-loss cases. Yet, even
in cases where all the usual standard mortgage clause terms are
present, the mortgagee who forecloses and bids the full debt at sale
has been denied recovery of insurance proceeds. The courts have
employed various rationales to achieve such results. In
Mildenberger the independent contract of insurance created by the
standard mortgage clause was considered to be of limited utility,
and the mortgagee's interest was said to be based upon the mortgage
debt rather than upon the property." The Rosenbaum court main-
tained that the value of the property to the bidder is reflected by
his bid and that receipt of insurance proceeds in addition to a pur-
chase for the full debt would result in excessive recovery for the
mortgagee . 3 Whitestone employed an estoppel argument based
upon the public policy of preventing a double recovery by the mort-
gagee." All three courts expressed the view that once the debt is
extinguished by the mortgagee's foreclosure and purchase for the
full amount of the debt, the mortgagee's interest in the policy is
terminated.
The soundness of the above arguments is questioned. In the
first place the majority of cases and authorities agree that the stan-
dard mortgage clause, unlike the open mortgage clause, creates an
62. See notes 46, 48, 49 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
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independent contract of insurance between insurer and mortgagee .5
At least one court has declared that the effect of the standard mort-
gage clause is "the same . . . as if the mortgagee had taken out a
separate policy .. . ."" Certainly this language does not limit the
impact of the clause. Second, in standard mortgage clause
foreclosure-loss cases the mortgagee's interest in the policy has out-
lived that of the mortgagor, thus demonstrating that the mortgagee
has an interest in the property, not merely in the debt. Third, al-
though the theory that the value of the property to the bidder is
reflected by his bid is correct as a general rule, its inflexible applica-
tion overlooks such circumstances as mistake or ignorance in bid-
ding. Furthermore, the estoppel theory assumes that in every case
where a bid of the full debt exceeds the value of the property there
are other lower bidders present. Surely this does not occur at every
such sale. Finally, the three standard mortgage clause loss-
foreclosure cases considered herein relied heavily on opinions from
open mortgage clause cases, with the result that the standard mort-
gage clause terms were totally disregarded. These terms were de-
signed to assure that the mortgagee's interest in the policy will not
be invalidated by a foreclosure or subsequent change in ownership.
Although they have been effectuated as unambiguous contractual
terms in foreclosure-loss cases, courts generally refuse to recognize
them in the loss-foreclosure sequence.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is apparent that the area of greatest confusion with regard to
mortgage clause cases is that of loss-foreclosure under the standard
mortgage clause. Here the courts have struggled to construct argu-
ments for denying recovery to the mortgagee, even to the point of
completely ignoring the clause provisions. Possibly the underlying
factor is that in loss-foreclosure situations the mortgagee has knowl-
edge of the loss before he forecloses, whereas no such knowledge is
available if loss follows foreclosure.
As seen above, counterarguments are available to attack hold-
ings which deny the mortgagee's recovery of insurance proceeds in
standard mortgage clause loss-foreclosure situations. Surely addi-
tional arguments could be designed to strengthen the confrontation;
however, the formulation of such arguments will only further ob-
65. See notes 16, 17, 38 supra and accompanying text.
66. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Brennan, 85 N.H. 291, 294, 158 A. 124, 126 (1932).
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scure what should be the courts' primary concern-the most equita-
ble solution possible in all controversies. Mechanical application of
any one rule of law will produce inequitable conclusions in many
cases. Some elementary examples will serve to illustrate such inequ-
ities, and the following diagram will simplify the discussion. (For
the purposes of these examples, assume: (1) that the mortgagor's
equity is $5,000, and (2) that the mortgagee's bid is equivalent to
the amount of the mortgage debt).
Example Value Amount of Value of Value of Insurance
of land mortgage house house proceeds
debt before loss after loss payable
A $5,000 $10,000 $10,000 $5,000 $5,000
B 5,000 12,500 12,500 $5,000 7,500
C 5,000 7,500 7,500 5,000 2,500
When $5,000 damage occurs to the house in example A, the
insurer is obligated, 7 in the absence of defenses, to pay proceeds of
a like amount. If the mortgagee then forecloses and purchases for
the full debt, he receives the full $10,000 value, because he obtains
land and a damaged house which are equal in value to his invest-
ment. Thus, the rule denying recovery to the mortgagee would pre-
serve the status quo, since the mortgagor also receives proceeds
equal to his equity. A rule allowing the mortgagee to recover in this
case would clearly result in his receiving a double recovery, while
the mortgagor would experience severe financial misfortune.
Example B illustrates the situation in which a bid for the full
mortgage debt exceeds the value of the property after loss. Payment
of the proceeds to the mortgagor provides him with an excess of
$2,500 over his equity, while the mortgagee suffers a $2,500 loss
because his bid for $12,500 purchased property worth only $10,000.
On the other hand, if the proceeds were paid to the mortgagee
he would realize a profit of $5,000 over his investment, and the
mortgagor again would lose his equity.
If the insurer in example C is obligated to pay $2,500 after the
67. The idea that generally the insurer is obligated to pay when the particular event
occurs was seen in In re Knight's Estate, 31 Wash.2d 813, 199 P.2d 89 (1948):
"Insurance," in its general sense, may be defined as an agreement by which one
person, for a consideration, promises to pay money or its equivalent, or to perform
some act of value, to or for the benefit of another person, upon the destruction, death,
loss, or injury of someone or something as the result of specified perils.
Id. at 816, 199 P.2d at 91.
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loss, payment of the funds to the mortgagor will still result in a
$2,500 loss to him, while the mortgagee has received $10,000 worth
of property for $7,500. Payment of the proceeds to the mortgagee
thus obviously causes further injustice.
The difficulties with a mechanical application of a particular
rule are obvious. Nevertheless, such treatment is clearly inferred
from language employed in loss-foreclosure cases. The courts ap-
pear to be striving for a rule that allows payment to the mortgagor.
In Whitestone, for example, the court ruled: "None dispute that the
mortgagee is entitled to recover only his debt. Any surplus value
belongs to others, namely, the mortgagor .... ,,"8 Yet the facts in
Whitestone appear quite similar to those in example B above. The
value of the premises"5 before the loss was $18,000, and the mortgage
debt was $11,500. After the loss the premises were valued at approx-
imately $9,000, and the insurer was obligated for an equal amount.
The court denied payment to the mortgagee, and then indicated
that the mortgagor was entitled to the funds:
The fact that a mortgagee may not recover on the insurance
does not necessarily mean that the insurer will not be obli-
gated to pay the mortgagor . . . . [I]n the absence of de-
fenses, it will be the mortgagor or his creditors who will
recover."
Such distribution would allow the mortgagor to receive $9,000 in
proceeds, although from the facts it appears that his equity in the
premises totaled only $6,500. And the mortgagee who bid $11,500 for
property worth $9,000 would suffer a $2,500 loss.
Thus, inequitable results will obtain if any rule of law is me-
chanically applied. A more desirable solution would be reached if
the courts employed their general equity powers to arrive at the
fairest possible distribution of proceeds. Rather than distorting the
terms of the standard mortgage clause in order to "punish" the
mortgagee for bidding an amount which exceeds the value of the
foreclosed property, the courts should attempt to distribute the pro-
ceeds in accordance with the parties' proportionate investments.
68. 28 N.Y.2d at 337, 270 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
69. It is assumed that the court used the word "premises" to include house and land.
See United States v. Meyer, 417 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1969): "The word "premises" when used
to describe an estate in land almost invariably refers to land and the tenements or
appurtenances thereto." Id. at 1023.
70. 28 N.Y.2d at 337, 27 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
1973]
et al.: Foreclosure, Loss, and the Proper Distribution of Insurance Proce
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
502 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
The following terms complete the typical standard mortgage
clause.
Provided also, that the mortgagee shall notify this
company of any change of ownership or occupancy or in-
crease of hazard which shall come to the knowledge of said
mortgagee and, unless permitted by this policy, it shall be
noted thereon and the mortgagee shall, on demand, pay the
premium for such increased hazard for the term of the use
thereof; otherwise this policy shall be null and void.
This company reserves the right to cancel this policy
at any time as provided by its terms, but in such case this
policy shall continue in force for the benefit only of the
mortgagee for ten days after notice to the mortgagee of such
cancellation, and shall then cease, and this company shall
have the right, on like notice, to cancel this agreement.
Whenever this company shall pay the mortgagee any
sum for loss or damage under this policy and shall claim
that, as to the mortgagor or owner, no liability therefore
existed, this company shall, to the extent of such payment,
be thereupon legally subrogated to all the rights of the
party to whom such payment shall be made, under all se-
curities held as collateral to the mortgage debt or may, at
its option, pay to the mortgagee the whole principal due or
to grow due on the mortgage with interest, and shall there-
upon receive a full assignment and transfer of the mort-
gage and of all such other securities; but no subrogation
shall impair the right of the mortgagee to recover the full
amount of his claim.
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